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A BARE-BONES MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF RADICALIZATION
C. CONNELL MCCLUSKEY, MANUELE SANTOPRETE
Abstract. Radicalization is the process by which people come to adopt increasingly ex-
treme political or religious ideologies. While radical thinking is by no means problematic
in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when it leads to violence. We introduce a
simple compartmental model (similar to epidemiology models) to describe the radicalization
process. We then extend the model to allow for multiple ideologies. Our approach is similar
to the one used in the study of multi-strain diseases. Based on our models, we assess several
strategies to counter violent extremism.
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1. Introduction
Radicalization is the process by which people come to adopt increasingly extreme political
or religious ideologies. In recent years, radicalization has become a major concern for national
security because it can lead to violent extremism. Governments and security services are
under intense pressure to detect and stop individuals undergoing radicalization before they
became violent extremists. As a consequence, they are making a substantial effort to better
understand the radicalization process and to identify the psychological, social, economic, and
political circumstances that lead to violent extremism. It is in this context that this paper
attempts to describe radicalization mathematically by modeling the spread of extremist
ideology in a manner similar to how the spread of infectious diseases has been modelled.
Vector-borne diseases have been used as a metaphor for Islamist militancy and radicaliza-
tion by Yacoubian and Stares [13], and by Post [9]. In this analogy the agent is the ideology,
the vector the recruiters, and the hosts are the members of the vulnerable population. This
analogy, although forceful, is inexact because transmission in vector-borne diseases (e.g.
malaria) involves at least two species: the vector and the human host, in which case it is
necessary to consider the dynamics of both species.
A more realistic analogy may be to consider, for instance, tuberculosis as a metaphor
for radicalization. In tuberculosis we have an agent (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) and a
population consisting of susceptible individuals (who are vulnerable to the agent), latently
infected individuals (who have been infected with M. tuberculosis but are not yet infectious)
and infectious individuals (who can transmit the disease). In this analogy the agent is the
ideology, susceptible individuals are those who have not embraced the extremist ideology,
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latent individuals are those who have accepted the extremist ideology to some degree, but are
not actively spreading it, and infectious individuals are recruiters who are spreading the ex-
tremist ideology to susceptibles. This point of view is useful for describing the radicalization
process of individuals and the recruitment in terrorist organizations from a mathematical
perspective.
In Section 2 we introduce a compartmental model to describe the radicalization process.
We divide the population into three compartments, (S) susceptible, (E) extremists, and (R)
recruiters. This model resembles tuberculosis model studied in [7].
A similar approach was taken in [1] where the authors studied the spread of fanatical
behaviours as a type of epidemiological contact process. Our model, however, is different
because it emphasizes the role of recruiters in the dynamics of terrorist organizations. We
note that our model, with minor modifications, may be applied to political parties (see [5]
for a mathematical model of political party growth). We view this model as bare-bones
because we concentrate our attention only on one aspect of this complex problem, namely,
the recruitment process.
The importance of recruiters in the radicalization process was recognized by President
Barack Obama, who in a 2015 op-ed for the LA times [8] wrote “We know that military force
alone cannot solve this problem. Nor can we simply take out terrorists who kill innocent
civilians. We also have to confront the violent extremists - the propagandists, recruiters
and enablers - who may not directly engage in terrorist acts themselves, but who radicalize,
recruit and incite others to do so.”
Using our model, we want to test some possible strategies for countering violent extremism.
A useful parameter that quantifies the transmission potential of an extremist ideology in our
model is the basic reproduction number R0. In mathematical epidemiology it is defined as
the number of secondary infections produced when one infectious individual is introduced
into a population consisting only of susceptible individuals. In Section 2, we will show that
when R0 < 1 the ideology will be eradicated; that is, eventually the number of recruiters
and extremist will go to zero. When R0 > 1 the ideology will become endemic; that is, the
recruiters and extremists, will establish themselves in the population.
In our bare-bones model the basic reproduction number is
R0 =
Λ
µ
β [cE + qR(µ+ dE)]
(µ+ dE + cE)(µ+ dR + cR)− cRcE
,
where µ is the mortality rate of the susceptible population, dE and dR are the additional
mortality rates of the extremists and recruiters, respectively, and β is the mass action trans-
mission coefficient of the ideology. (Other parameters are described in Section 2.)
One approach to dealing with extremism is to attempt to kill or remove extremists and
recruiters, corresponding to increasing the parameters dE and dR. Since R0 is a decreasing
function of these two parameters, this would in turn decrease R0. Consequently, according
to our model, these are potentially successful strategies to counter violent extremism. A
different strategy consists of decreasing the parameter β by bolstering the resilience of com-
munities to recruitment into radicalization and violent extremism. This is, one aspect of the
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“Countering Violent Extremisms” program of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
[11], one aspect of the “Prevent Strategy” [3] of the British government, and the “Pre-
vent” element of the “Building Resilience Against Terrorism” strategy of the Government of
Canada [10].
Another strategy we want to test consists of supporting an alternative, more moderate
ideology that competes with the terrorist ideology. This is, for instance, another aspect of
the “Prevent” element of the “Building Resilience Against Terrorism” strategy of the Gov-
ernment of Canada [10]. In fact, one of the desired outcomes listed for the “Prevent” element
[10] is the following: “Violent extremist ideology is effectively challenged by producing ef-
fective narratives to counter it.” This approach is also advocated by Yacoubian and Stares
[13] and by Post [9].
To study the effectiveness of this approach, in Section 3, we generalize our model to include
two ideologies under the assumption that individuals cannot move from one ideology to the
other. Based on how parameters are chosen, we may have one moderate ideology and one
extreme, or two extreme ideologies. For this model there are two basic reproduction numbers
R1, associated with the first ideology, and R2 associated with the second ideology. We will
prove that if both reproduction number are less than one then both ideologies will eventually
be eradicated. If, however, one of the reproduction numbers is larger than the other, say
R1 > R2, then the second ideology will be eliminated; that is, the number of recruiters and
extremist supporting the second ideology will eventually go to zero. This can happen even
if R2 > 1. This is a version of the so called principle of competitive exclusion of ecology and
epidemiology [6]. Our analysis suggests that introducing and supporting another ideology, in
conjunction with the approaches we mentioned above (i.e., targeting terrorists and recruiters
and increasing the resilience of communities to radical ideologies), may bolster the overall
effectiveness of strategies to counter violent extremism.
Finally, in Section 4, we amend the two ideology model to take into account that indi-
viduals subscribing to one ideology may change their mind and commit to another ideology,
this is done by introducing a cross-interaction term. We assume that the flow of individuals
is from ideology one to ideology two. If we take the second ideology to be the moderate
one, we can use this cross interaction term to model de-radicalization. By de-radicalization
we mean, following Horgan [4], the social and psychological process whereby an individ-
ual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent
that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. There
are many factors that may contribute to de-radicalization, including, possibly, some of the
programs developed by the British, Canadian and U.S. Governments [3, 10, 11]. If, instead,
we take the first ideology to be the moderate one, we can use the cross-interaction term to
model individuals subscribing to a moderate ideology that change their mind and become
radicalized.
Naturally, we are interested in understanding how the presence of the cross-interaction
term changes the results obtained in Section 3. There are two main changes. First of
all, it is possible to have a coexistence equilibrium, where both ideologies persist. This, of
course, may be an unwelcome modification since our goal is to eradicate the more extreme
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of the ideologies. If the coexistence equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable this makes
eliminating either ideology difficult. Second, recall that in Section 3 the ideology with the
larger reproduction number dominates, and the other ideology eventually vanishes. With
the cross-interaction term, even if R1 > R2, it is possible that the second ideology can
come to dominate. This is because the cross-interaction term gives a competitive advantage
to the second ideology. The main lesson we take away from this is that, based on our
analysis of Section 3, introducing a second more moderate ideology may considerably enhance
other efforts to counter violent extremism. If cross-interaction terms are taken into account,
however, based on our analysis of Section 4, such advantages may be reduced if the moderate
ideology is the first one, and it becomes a pathway to the second (more extreme) ideology.
2. Bare-Bones Model
2.1. Equations. We model the spread of extreme ideology as a contact process. We use
a compartmental model (similar to that which is used to model epidemics) to describe
the dynamics. We assume that within the full population there is a subpopulation that
is potentially at risk of adopting the ideology. (For example, for the ideology of violent
resistance to British rule in Northern Ireland during the late 20th century for the purpose of
joining the Republic of Ireland, the subpopulation that was potentially at risk of adopting
the ideology would primarily consist of the Catholic subpopulation of Northern Ireland.) We
further divide this subpopulation into three compartments:
• susceptibles - S
• extremists - E
• recruiters - R.
The transfer diagram for the system appears in Figure 1.
The susceptible class consists of individuals that have not adopted the extremist ideology.
The extremist group includes violent adopters of the ideology that engage in terrorists acts.
The recruiters group includes those that Barack Obama, former President of the United
States of America defined as “—the propagandists, recruiters and enablers— who may not
directly engage in terrorist acts themselves, but who radicalize, recruit and incite others to
do so” [8].
New individuals enter the population into the susceptible group at the constant rate Λ.
The per capita death rate for natural causes is µ, so that the average life expectancy is 1/µ.
Extremists and recruiters have additional removal rates, due to being captured or killed,
with rate constants dE and dR, respectively.
We assume that susceptibles and recruiters interact according to a mass action law, and
that the rate at which susceptibles are recruited to adopt the extremist ideology is propor-
tional to the number of interations that are occuring. Thus, susceptibles are recruited at
rate βSR, with a fraction qE entering the extremist class and a fraction qR = 1−qE entering
the recruiter class.
Extremists switch to the recruiter class with rate constant cE , while recruiters enter the
extremist class with rate constant cR. Thus, the radicalization model consists of the following
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S
R
E
qRβSR
qEβSRµS
cRR cEE
Λ
(µ+ dR)R
(µ+ dE)E
Figure 1. Transfer diagram for the bare-bones model. It shows the progres-
sion of radicalization from the Susceptible (S) class to the extremist (E), and
recruiter (R) classes.
differential equations together with non-negative initial conditions:
(2.1)
S ′ = Λ− µS − βSR
E ′ = qEβSR− (µ+ dE + cE)E + cRR
R′ = qRβSR + cEE − (µ+ dR + cR)R,
where qE + qR = 1, qE , qR ∈ [0, 1] and all other parameters are positive.
Note that although the problem we are addressing is similar to the one studied in [1], the
model considered in [1] does not include the recruiters.
Proposition 2.1. Under the flow described by (2.1), the region
∆ =
{
(S,E,R) ∈ R3≥0 : S + E + I ≤
Λ
µ
}
is positively invariant and attracting within R3≥0 (i.e. all solutions starting in ∆ remain in
∆ for all t > 0, while solutions starting outside ∆ either enter or approach in the limit).
Proof. We check the direction of the vector field along the boundary of ∆. Along S = 0
we have S ′ = Λ > 0 so the vector field points inwards. Along E = 0 we have E ′ =
qEβSR + cRR ≥ 0 provided R, S ≥ 0. Similarly, along R = 0 we have R
′ = cEE ≥ 0
provided E ≥ 0. It follows from [2, Proposition 2.1] that R3≥0 is positively invariant.
Let T = S + E +R. Then
T ′ = S ′ + E ′ +R′ = Λ− µT − dRR− dEE ≤ Λ− µT.
Using a standard comparison theorem, it follows that
(2.2) T (t) ≤
(
T (0)−
Λ
µ
)
e−µt +
Λ
µ
.
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for t ≥ 0. Thus, if T (0) ≤ Λ
µ
, then T (t) ≤ Λ
µ
for all t ≥ 0. Hence, the set ∆ is positively
invariant. Furthermore, it follows from (2.2), that lim supt→∞ T ≤
Λ
µ
, demonstrating that ∆
is attracting within R3≥0. 
2.2. Equilibrium Points. There are no equilibria with S equal to zero. The only equilib-
rium with either E or R equal to zero is x0 = (S0, 0, 0) =
(
Λ
µ
, 0, 0
)
. To find other equilibria
x∗ = (S∗, E∗, R∗) ∈ R3>0, we first set E
′ = R′ = 0, treating S∗ as a parameter. This gives
the linear system
(2.3)
[
−(µ+ dE + cE) qEβS
∗ + cR
cE qRβS
∗ − (µ+ dR + cR)
] [
E∗
R∗
]
=
[
0
0
]
In order to have non-zero solutions for E∗ and R∗, the coefficient matrix must be singular
and have determinant zero. Recalling that qE + qR = 1, this gives
(2.4) S∗ =
(µ+ dE + cE)(µ+ dR + cR)− cEcR
β[cE + qR(µ+ dE)]
=
1
Γ
,
where
Γ =
β[cE + qR(µ+ dE)]
(µ+ dE + cE)(µ+ dR + cR)− cEcR
.
With this value of S∗, there is a infinite number of solutions to (2.3). To find a positive
equilibrium, we take the first line of (2.1) and solve for R∗ obtaining
R∗ =
Λ− µS∗
βS∗
=
µ
β
(
ΛΓ
µ
− 1
)
,
which is positive for R0 =
ΛΓ
µ
> 1, where R0 is the basic reproduction number that we will
calculate in the next section.
Adding E ′ and R′ at an equilibrium gives
0 = βS∗R∗ − (µ+ dE)E
∗ − (µ+ dR)R
∗
Isolating E∗, and noting that βS∗ = β
Γ
, we find
(2.5) E∗ =
β
Γ
− (µ+ dR)
µ+ dE
R∗.
Note that
Γ <
β[µ+ dE + cE ]
(µ+ dE + cE)(µ+ dR)
=
β
µ+ dR
.
Combining this observation with (2.5), we see that E∗ and R∗ have the same sign (which
depends on the sign of R0 − 1).
Theorem 2.2. If R0 < 1, then the only equilibrium is x0 =
(
Λ
µ
, 0, 0
)
. If R0 > 1, then there
are two equilibria: x0 and x
∗ = (S∗, E∗, R∗) ∈ R3>0,
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2.3. The basic reproduction number R0. The basic reproduction number R0 is the
spectral radius of the next generation matrix N , and can be calculated as follows (see [12]
for a full description of the method). The next generation matrix is given by N = FV −1
with
F =
∂FE∂E ∂FE∂R
∂FR
∂E
∂FR
∂R
 (x0) and V =
∂VE∂E ∂VE∂R
∂VR
∂E
∂VR
∂R
 (x0).
Here, FE and FR are the rates of appearance of newly radicalized individuals in the classes
E and R, respectively. The movement between E and R is given by VE and VR. In our case
F =
[
FE
FR
]
=
[
qEβSR
qRβSR
]
and V =
[
VE
VR
]
=
[
(µ+ dE + cE)E − cRR
−cEE + (µ+ dR + cR)R
]
,
so that E ′ = FE − VE and R
′ = FR − VR. Hence
F = βS0
[
0 qE
0 qR
]
and V =
[
(µ+ dE + cE) −cR
−cE (µ+ dR + cR)
]
.
We now have
N = FV −1 =
βS0
(µ+ dE + cE)(µ+ dR + cR)− cRcE
[
0 qE
0 qR
] [
(µ+ dR + cR) cR
cE (µ+ dE + cE)
]
Note that F has rank 1 and so the same is true of N . Since one eigenvalue of N is zero the
spectral radius is equal to the absolute value of the remaining eigenvalue. Since the trace is
equal to the sum of the eigenvalues and there is only one non-zero eigenvalue, we see that
the spectral radius of N is equal to the absolute value of the trace (which happens to be
positive). Thus,
(2.6) R0 = S0
β[cE + qR(µ+ dE)]
(µ+ dE + cE)(µ+ dR + cR)− cEcR
=
Λ
µ
Γ.
The following result follows immediately from [12, Theorem 2].
Theorem 2.3. If R0 < 1, then x0 is locally asymptotically stable. If R0 > 1, then x0 is
unstable.
2.4. Global stability of x0 for R0 ≤ 1. For the calculations of this section and later
sections, it is convenient to define
c˜ = cE + qR(µ+ dE) and D = (µ+ dR + cR)(µ+ dE + cE)− cEcR.
This allows us, for instance, to write R0 =
βΛc˜
µD
. We will now study the global stability of x0
by taking the Lyapunov function
U = S0g
(
S
S0
)
+
cE
c˜
E +
µ+ dE + cE
c˜
R,
where
(2.7) g(x) = x− 1− ln(x).
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Note that S ′|S=0 = Λ > 0. Combining this with the fact that ∆ is compact, positively
invariant and attracting, it follows that lim inf S(t) > 0, and so we may assume that S > 0.
Thus, the singularity in g at 0 is not a problem.
Differentiating U , and recalling that Λ = µS0, we find
U ′ =
(
1−
S0
S
)
S ′ +
cE
c˜
E ′ +
µ+ dE + cE
c˜
R′
=
(
1−
S0
S
)
(Λ− µS − βSR) +
cE
c˜
(qEβSR− (µ+ dE + cE)E + cRR)
+
µ+ dE + cE
c˜
(qRβSR + cEE − (µ+ dR + cR)R)
=
(
1−
S0
S
)
(µS0 − µS) + βS0R + βSR
[
−1 +
qEcE + qR(µ+ dE + cE)
c˜
]
+
cEcR − (µ+ dE + cE) (µ+ dR + cR)
c˜
R
= −µ
(S − S0)
2
S
+
[
βS0 −
D
c˜
]
R
= −µ
(S − S0)
2
S
+
D
c˜
[
βΛc˜
µD
− 1
]
R
= −µ
(S − S0)
2
S
+
D
c˜
[R0 − 1]R
For R0 ≤ 1, we have U
′ ≤ 0 with equality only if S = S0. However, the largest invariant set
for which S remains constant at S0 consists of just the equilibrium x0. Thus, by LaSalle’s
Invariance Principle, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4. If R0 ≤ 1, then x0 is globally asymptotically stable on R
3
≥0.
2.5. Global stability of x∗ for R0 > 1.
Theorem 2.5. If R0 > 1, then the equilibrium x
∗ is globally asymptotically stable on R3>0.
Proof. We study the global stability of x∗ by considering the Lyapunov function
W = S∗g
(
S
S∗
)
+ AE∗g
(
E
E∗
)
+BR∗g
(
R
R∗
)
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where g is given in (2.7), and the constants A and B are given below. Differentiating W
along solutions of (2.1) gives
W ′ =
(
1−
S∗
S
)
S ′ + A
(
1−
E∗
E
)
E ′ + B
(
1−
R∗
R
)
R′
=
(
1−
S∗
S
)
[Λ− µS − βSR] + A
(
1−
E∗
E
)
[qEβSR− (µ+ dE + cE)E + cRR]
+B
(
1−
R∗
R
)
[qRβSR+ cEE − (µ+ dR + cR)R] .
Note that by considering Equation (2.1) at x∗ we have
Λ = µS∗ + βS∗R∗
(µ+ dE + cE)E
∗ = qEβS
∗R∗ + cRR
∗
(µ+ dR + cR)R
∗ = qRβS
∗R∗ + cEE
∗
Using these relationships to rewrite W ′ yields
W ′ =
(
1−
S∗
S
)[
µS∗
(
1−
S
S∗
)
+ βS∗R∗
(
1−
SR
S∗R∗
)]
+ A
(
1−
E∗
E
)[
qEβS
∗R∗
(
SR
S∗R∗
−
E
E∗
)
+ cRR
∗
(
R
R∗
−
E
E∗
)]
+B
(
1−
R∗
R
)[
qRβS
∗R∗
(
SR
S∗R∗
−
R
R∗
)
+ cEE
∗
(
E
E∗
−
R
R∗
)]
To make the equations more concise, we define s = S
S∗
, e = E
E∗
and r = R
R∗
. Then
W ′ =µS∗
[
2− s−
1
s
]
+ AcRR
∗
[
r − e−
r
e
+ 1
]
+BcEE
∗
[
e− r −
e
r
+ 1
]
+ βS∗R∗
[(
1−
1
s
− sr + r
)
+ AqE
(
sr − e−
sr
e
+ 1
)
+BqR (sr − r − s + 1)
]
.
We now choose A,B > 0 so that AqE + BqR = 1, and BcEE
∗ = AcRR
∗ + AqEβS
∗R∗. The
first of these conditions allows us to distribute the term
(
1− 1
s
− sr + r
)
into the two terms
with coefficients AqE and BqR. The second condition allows us to replace BcEE
∗. We now
have
W ′ =µS∗
[
2− s−
1
s
]
+ AcRR
∗
[
2−
r
e
−
e
r
]
+ βS∗R∗
[
AqE
(
3−
1
s
−
e
r
−
sr
e
)
+BqR
(
2− s−
1
s
)]
,
which is less or equal to zero by the arithmetic mean–geometric mean inequality, with equality
if and only if S = S∗, E/R = E∗/R∗. The largest invariant set for which S remains constant
at S∗ consists of just the equilibrium x∗. Thus, by LaSalle’s Invariance Principle, we may
conclude that x∗ is globally asymptotically stable. 
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3. Multiple Ideology Model
A situation that may preclude the spread of a violent extremist ideology is the presence of
a competing more moderate ideology. In this section we want to study whether or not this
approach may work. In ecology a similar occurrence is often governed by the competitive
exclusion principle. This principle states that competitors cannot coexist in the same niche.
A similar principle holds in some epidemiological systems [6].
3.1. Equations. We consider a population that is influenced by two ideologies. The popu-
lation of interest is now divided into five compartments:
• susceptibles - S
• extremists following the first ideology - E1
• recruiters for the first ideology - R1.
• extremists following the second ideology - E2
• recruiters for the second ideology - R2.
The transfer diagram for the system appears in Figure 2. The differential equations that
govern the system are:
(3.1)
S ′ = Λ− µS − β1SR1 − β2SR2
E ′1 = qE1β1SR1 − (µ+ dE1 + cE1)E1 + cR1R1
R′1 = qR1β1SR1 + cE1E1 − (µ+ dR1 + cR1)R1
E ′2 = qE2β2SR2 − (µ+ dE2 + cE2)E2 + cR2R2
R′2 = qR2β2SR2 + cE2E2 − (µ+ dR2 + cR2)R2,
where qE1+ qR1 = 1, qE1, qR1 ∈ [0, 1], qE2+ qR2 = 1, qE2 , qR2 ∈ [0, 1], and all other parameters
are positive.
S
R1
E1
R2
E2
qR1βSR1
qE1βSR1µS
cR1R1 cE1E1
Λ
(µ+ dR)R1
(µ+ dE)E1
qR2βSR2
qE2βSR2
cR2R2 cE2E2
(µ+ dR2)R2
(µ+ dE2)E2
Figure 2. Transfer diagram for the model with two competing ideologies.
A BARE-BONES MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF RADICALIZATION 11
Let T = S +R1+E1+R2+E2 be the total population. The proof of the following result
is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 3.1. The region ∆˜ =
{
(S,E1, R1, E2, R2) ∈ R
5
≥0 : T ≤
Λ
µ
}
is positively invari-
ant and attracting within R5≥0 for the flow of (3.1).
3.2. Equilibrium Points and Basic Reproduction Numbers. Generally, System (3.1)
has up to three equilibria. The computations are similar to the ones shown in the previous
section. The first equilibrium point is an ideology-free equilibrium:
x0 = (S,E1, R1, E2, R2) =
(
Λ
µ
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
.
In order to describe the other two equilibria, it is useful to first define the basic reproduc-
tion number for each ideology. (These quantities will be calculated derived using the next
generation matrix method in Subsection 3.3.) For i = 1, 2, let
Ri =
βiΛc˜i
µDi
,
where c˜i = cEi + qRi (µ+ dEi) and Di = (µ + dRi + cRi)(µ + dEi + cEi) − cEicRi. It is also
useful to define
Γi =
βic˜i
Di
,
for i = 1, 2, which leads to Ri =
Λ
µ
Γi.
For R1 > 1, there is an equilibrium x
∗ in which extremists and recruiters for ideology one
are present (i.e. E1, R1 6= 0), while ideology two is absent (i.e. E2 = R2 = 0). This is called
the ideology-one dominance equilibrium, and is given by
x∗ = (S∗, E∗1 , R
∗
1, 0, 0) =
(
1
Γ1
,
β1
Γ1
− (µ+ dR1)
µ+ dE1
R∗1,
µ
β1
(R1 − 1) , 0, 0
)
.
For R2 > 1, there is an equilibrium x
∗∗ in which extremists and recruiters for ideology
one are present (i.e. E2, R2 6= 0), while ideology two is absent (i.e. E1 = R1 = 0). This is
called a ideology-two dominance equilibrium, and is given by
x∗∗ = (S∗∗, 0, 0, E∗∗2 , R
∗∗
2 ) =
(
1
Γ2
, 0, 0,
β2
Γ2
− (µ+ dR2)
µ+ dE2
R∗∗2 ,
µ
β2
(R2 − 1)
)
.
The existence conditions for these equilibria are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. The ideology-free equilibrium x0 always exists. In addition, there is an
ideology-one dominance equilibrium x∗ if and only if R1 > 1. Similarly, there is an ideology-
two dominance equilibrium x∗∗ if and only if R2 > 1.
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An equilibrium in which practitioners of each type are present is called a coexistence
equilibrium. For a coexistence equilibrium the equations E ′1 = R
′
1 = E
′
2 = R
′
2 = 0 must be
satisfied. Treating S as a parameter we can view each of E ′1 = R
′
1 = 0 and E
′
2 = R
′
2 = 0 as
homogeneous linear systems in two variables. Since we are looking for non-trivial solutions of
such systems the same argument used in Subsection 2.2 shows that the first system requires
S =
1
Γ1
=
Λ
µ
1
R1
,
while the second system requires
S =
1
Γ2
=
Λ
µ
1
R2
.
These two expression for S are consistent if and only if R1 = R2. Hence, in the generic case
in which the two reproduction numbers are different there is no coexistence equilibrium.
3.3. Basic Reproduction Numbers and Invasion Numbers. There are two equilibria
x0 and x
∗∗ for which the first ideology is absent. Thus, it is reasonable to consider whether the
first ideology is able to invade near each of these equilibria. This is determined by studying
the next generation matrix. (Similar calculations for the second ideology will follow.)
Using the terminology in [12], the variables E1 and R1 will be considered as “infected”
variables for the first ideology. We will describe them as “adopters” while still using the
approach and notation described in [12]. The rates of new adoptions of the first ideology is
given by F and the movement between the groups of adopters is given by V, with
F =
[
FE1
FR1
]
=
[
qE1β1SR1
qR1β1SR1
]
and V =
[
VE1
VR1
]
=
[
(µ+ dE1 + cE1)E1 − cR1R1
−cE1E1 + (µ+ dR1 + cR1)R1
]
.
Let S¯ be the value of S at the equilibrium of interest - either x0 or x
∗∗. Then
F = β1S¯
[
0 qE1
0 qR1
]
and V =
[
(µ+ dE1 + cE1) −cR1
−cE1 (µ+ dR1 + cR1)
]
,
The next generation matrix N is given by
N = FV −1 =
β1S¯
D1
[
0 qE1
0 qR1
] [
(µ+ dR1 + cR1) cR1
cE1 (µ+ dE1 + cE1)
]
.
One eigenvalue of N is 0 and so the other eigenvalue is equal to the trace, which is S¯Γ1.
Thus, the expected number of new adopters of the first ideology, caused by a single adherent
to the ideology near x0, is given by
R1 = S0Γ1 =
Λ
µ
Γ1,
the same as was defined in the Subsection 3.2. Similarly, the expected number of new
adopters of the first ideology, caused by a single adherent to the ideology, when the system
is near x∗∗, is given by
I1 = S
∗∗Γ1 =
Γ1
Γ2
.
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I1 is called the invasion number for the first ideology. The sign of I1−1 determines whether
or not the first ideology can invade near x∗∗. For the second ideology, we can similarly
calculate
R2 =
Λ
µ
Γ2 and I2 =
Γ2
Γ1
.
It now follows that
I1 =
R1
R2
and I2 =
R2
R1
.
By [12, Theorem 2], we have the following result.
Theorem 3.3. The following table outlines the existence and local stability of the equilibria
x0, x
∗ and x∗∗ (where LAS denotes locally asymptotically stable and a hyphen denotes that
the equilibrium does not exist).
x0 x
∗ x∗∗
R1,R2 < 1 LAS - -
R1 < 1 < R2 unstable - LAS
R2 < 1 < R1 unstable LAS -
1 < R2 < R1 unstable LAS unstable
1 < R1 < R2 unstable unstable LAS
This theorem characterizes how the system behaves near each of the equilibria based on
R1 and R2. For instance, if R1 < 1 and R2 < 1 and the initial number of adopters of each
ideology is sufficiently small, then both ideologies will disappear. When both ideologies are
able to survive in isolation (i.e. 1 < R1,R2), then the invasion numbers I1 and I2 determine
whether or not a small amount of one ideology can successfully invade when the other is
already established at its equilibrium.
3.4. The global dynamics. The stability results given in the previous subsection were
local in nature. We now give the global results.
Theorem 3.4. If R1 < 1 and R2 < 1, then x0 is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. Note that S ′|S=0 = Λ > 0, and so we may assume that S > 0. We now study the
stability of x0 using the Lyapunov function
U = S0g
(
S
S0
)
+
cE1
c˜1
E1 +
µ+ dE1 + cE1
c˜1
R1 +
cE2
c˜2
E2 +
µ+ dE2 + cE2
c˜2
R2
where the function g is given in (2.7). A computation similar to the one in the proof of
Theorem 2.4 shows that
U ′ = −µ
(S − S0)
2
S
+
D1
c˜1
[R1 − 1]R1 +
D2
c˜2
[R2 − 1]R2.
By LaSalle’s principle it follows that if R1 < 1 and R2 < 1 then x0 is globally asymptotically
stable. 
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Theorem 3.5. If R1 > max {1,R2}, then x
∗ is globally asymptotically stable. If R2 >
max {1,R1}, then x
∗∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. Suppose thatR2 > max {1,R1}. (We prove this case because it will help in Section 4.)
Since R2 > 1, the equilibrium x
∗∗ is non-negative. Let
W =W1 +W2,
with
W1 =
cE1
c˜1
E1 +
µ+ dE1 + cE1
c˜1
R1
and
W2 = S
∗∗g
(
S
S∗∗
)
+ AE∗∗2 g
(
E2
E∗∗2
)
+BR∗∗2 g
(
R2
R∗∗2
)
,
where A and B are chosen so that AqE2+BqR2 = 1 and BcE2E
∗∗
2 = AcR2R
∗∗
2 +AqE2β2S
∗∗R∗∗2 .
Recalling that c˜1 = cE1 + qR1 (µ+ dE1), we find that
W ′1 = β1SR1 −
D1
c˜1
R1.
In the calculations that follow, we use the scaled variables (s, e2, r2) =
(
S
S∗∗
, E2
E∗∗
2
, R2
R∗∗
2
)
. A
computation similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 2.5 shows that
W ′2 =µS
∗∗
[
2− s−
1
s
]
+ AcR2R
∗∗
2
[
2−
r2
e2
−
e2
r2
]
+ β2S
∗∗R∗∗2
[
AqE2
(
3−
1
s
−
e2
r2
−
sr2
e2
)
+BqR2
(
2− s−
1
s
)]
+ β1R1 (S
∗∗ − S)
Thus, we have
W ′ = µS∗∗
[
2− s−
1
s
]
+ AcR2R
∗∗
2
[
2−
r2
e2
−
e2
r2
]
+ β2S
∗∗R∗∗2
[
AqE2
(
3−
1
s
−
e2
r2
−
sr2
e2
)
+BqR2
(
2− s−
1
s
)]
+
D1
c˜1
(
β1c˜1
D1
S∗∗ − 1
)
R1
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Recalling that Γ1 =
β1c˜1
D1
, S∗∗ = 1
Γ2
and Ri =
Λ
µ
Γi, it follows that
β1c˜1
D1
S∗∗ = Γ1
Γ2
= R1
R2
< 1.
Using that fact, along with the arithmetic mean–geometric mean inequality, we have
(3.2)
W ′ = µS∗∗
[
2− s−
1
s
]
+ AcR2R
∗∗
2
[
2−
e2
r2
−
r2
e2
]
+ β2S
∗∗R∗∗2
[
AqE2
(
3−
1
s
−
e2
r2
−
sr2
e2
)
+BqR2
(
2− s−
1
s
)]
+
D1
c˜1
(
R1
R2
− 1
)
R1
≤ 0,
with equality only if s = 1 (meaning S = S∗∗) and R1 = 0. The largest invariant set for which
S remains constant at S∗∗ and R1 remains constant at 0 consists of just the equilibrium x
∗∗.
Thus, by LaSalle’s Invariance Principle, we may conclude that x∗∗ is globally asymptotically
stable whenever R2 > max {1,R1}.
The proof that x∗ is globally asymptotically stable whenever R1 > max {1,R2} is similar.

Coexistence is not possible except for the degenerate case R1 = R2.
4. Multiple Ideology Model with Cross-interaction
It is known that in nature many species of microorganisms stably coexist while interact-
ing with each other. In mathematical epidemiology several mechanisms for coexistence of
competing strains of a pathogen have been studied. Of particular relevance for us is the
mechanism of superinfection, that is, the process by which an individual that has previously
been infected by one strain of a pathogen becomes infected with a different strain. The
second strain is assumed to “take over” the infected individual immediately [6]. Thus this
individual is considered to be infected by only the second strain of the pathogen. In our
considerations, the role of pathogens is replaced by ideologies.
4.1. Equations. We introduce a cross-interaction term to take into account that some of
the extremists subscribing to one ideology may switch to supporting the other ideology - but
only in one direction. We assume that recruiters do not change from one ideologies to the
other.
(4.1)
S ′ = Λ− µS − β1SR1 − β2SR2
E ′1 = qE1β1SR1 − (µ+ dE1 + cE1)E1 + cR1R1 − δE1E2
R′1 = qR1β1SR1 + cE1E1 − (µ+ dR1 + cR1)R1
E ′2 = qE2β2SR2 − (µ+ dE2 + cE2)E2 + cR2R2 + δE1E2
R′2 = qR2β2SR2 + cE2E2 − (µ+ dR2 + cR2)R2
where qE1 + qR1 = qE2 + qR2 = 1, with qE1 , qR1, qE2 , qR2 ∈ [0, 1].
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S
R1
E1
R2
E2
qR1βSR1
qE1βSR1
µS
cR1R1 cE1E1
Λ
(µ+ dR)R1
(µ+ dE)E1
qR2βSR2
qE2βSR2
cR2R2 cE2E2
(µ+ dR2)R2
(µ+ dE2)E2
δE1E2
Figure 3. Transfer diagram for the model with two ideologies and cross-
interaction.
Let T = S + R1 + E1 + R2 + E2 be the total population, then we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The region ∆˜ =
{
(S,E1, R1, E2, R2) ∈ R
5
≥0 : T ≤
Λ
µ
}
is positively invari-
ant and attracting within R5≥0 for the flow of (4.1).
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1.
4.2. Equilibrium points. This new system shares three equilibrium points with the pre-
vious system. In fact, it is easy to see that the system has the following equilibrium points
that were defined in Section 3.2:
x0 =
(
Λ
µ
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
x∗ = (S∗, E∗1 , R
∗
1, 0, 0)
x∗∗ = (S∗∗, 0, 0, E∗∗2 , R
∗∗
2 )
In some cases there is also a coexistence equilibrium, which will be studied later.
4.3. Basic reproduction numbers and invasion numbers. The basic reproduction
numbers for this model coincide with the ones obtained for the previous model. That is, we
have
Ri =
Λ
µ
Γi = βi
Λ
µ
cEi + qRi (µ+ dEi)
(µ+ dRi + cRi)(µ+ dEi + cEi)− cEicRi
for i = 1, 2.
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Proposition 4.2. The equilibrium x0 is locally asymptotically stable if max {R1,R2} < 1,
and is unstable if max {R1,R2} > 1.
The invasion number Iδ2 : To compute the invasion number I
δ
2 of the second ideology
(near x∗, where the first ideology is established), we note that the variables associated with
the second ideology are E2 and R2. We have
F =
[
FE2
FR2
]
=
[
qE2β2SR2 + δE1E2
qR2β2SR2
]
and V =
[
VE2
VR2
]
=
[
(µ+ dE2 + cE2)E2 − cR2R2
−cE2E2 + (µ+ dR2 + cR2)R2
]
.
Differentiating and evaluating at x∗, we obtain
F =
[
δE∗1 qE2β2S
∗
0 qR2β2S
∗
]
and V =
[
µ+ dE2 + cE2 −cR2
−cE2 µ+ dR2 + cR2
]
,
and so the next generation matrix is
N = FV −1
=
1
D2
[
δE∗1 qE2β2S
∗
0 qR2β2S
∗
] [
µ+ dR2 + cR2 cR2
cE2 µ+ dE2 + cE2
]
=
1
D2
[
δE∗1(µ+ dR2 + cR2) + qE2β2S
∗cE2 δE
∗
1cR2 + qE2β2S
∗(µ+ dE2 + cE2)
qR2β2S
∗cE2 qR2β2S
∗(µ+ dE2 + cE2)
]
=
[
A B
C D
]
,
where A, B, C, and D are defined by this equation. The invasion number of the second
ideology is the spectral radius of N , namely,
Iδ2 =
(A+D) +
√
(A+D)2 − 4(AD − BC)
2
=
(A+D) +
√
(A−D)2 + 4BC
2
.
The case where δ = 0 is the same as the case studied in Section 3, and it can be verified that
the expression given here gives Iδ2
∣∣
δ=0
= R2
R1
, which agrees with the expression for I2 given
in Section 3.
We can view A and B as strictly increasing functions of δ, while C and D do not depend on
δ. Since A,B,C,D are all strictly positive, it is easy to verify that
∂Iδ
2
∂A
and
∂Iδ
2
∂B
are positive.
Thus, Iδ2 is a strictly increasing function of δ, and so
Iδ2 >
R2
R1
for δ > 0. This makes sense as it suggests that larger values of δ make it “easier” for the
second ideology to invade a population where the first ideology is already established.
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The invasion number Iδ1 : To compute the invasion number I
δ
1 of the first ideology (near
x∗∗, where the second ideology is established), we note that the variables associated with the
first ideology are E1 and R1. In this case,
F =
[
FE1
FR1
]
=
[
qE1β1SR1
qR1β1SR1
]
and V =
[
VE1
VR1
]
=
[
(µ+ dE1 + cE1)E1 − cR1R1 + δE1E2
(µ+ dR1 + cR1)R1 − cE1E1
]
.
Consequently,
F =
[
0 qE1S
∗∗β1
0 qR1S
∗∗β1
]
and V =
[
µ+ dE1 + cE1 + δE
∗∗
2 −cR1
−cE1 µ+ dR1 + cR1
]
,
and the next generation matrix is
N =
1
D1 + δE∗∗2 (µ+ dR1 + cR1)
[
0 qE1S
∗∗β1
0 qR1S
∗∗β1
] [
µ+ dR1 + cR1 cR1
cE1 µ+ dE1 + cE1 + δE
∗∗
2
]
.
Since F has rank one, the same is true of N . Thus, N has only one non-zero eigenvalue,
which is positive and which must be equal to the trace. So, the trace of N is equal to its
spectral radius, and therefore is equal to Iδ1 . That is,
Iδ1 =
β1S
∗∗[cE1 + qR1(µ+ dE1) + qR1δE
∗∗
2 ]
D1 + δE∗∗2 (µ+ dR1 + cR1)
=
β1[c˜1 + qR1δE
∗∗
2 ]
Γ2[D1 + δE
∗∗
2 (µ+ dR1 + cR1)]
.
Differentiating with respect to δ yields
dIδ1
dδ
=
β1E
∗∗
2 [qR1D1 − c˜1(µ+ dR1 + cR1)]
Γ2[D1 + δE
∗∗
2 (µ+ dR1 + cR1)]
2
= −
β1E
∗∗
2 cE1[cR1 + qE1(µ+ dR1)]
Γ2[D1 + δE
∗∗
2 (µ+ dR1 + cR1)]
2
< 0.
Thus, Iδ1 is a strictly decreasing function of δ. Recalling from Section 3 that I
δ
1
∣∣
δ=0
= R1
R2
,
we have the following inequality
Iδ1 <
R1
R2
,
for δ > 0. This makes sense as it suggests that larger values of δ make it “harder” for the
first ideology to invade a population where the second ideology is already established.
The following theorem follows from [12, Theorem 2], which connects the local stability of
a boundary equilibrium to the basic reproduction number (or invasion number) calculated
at that equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose R1 > 1 and R2 > 1. Then
(1) The equilibrium x∗ is locally asymptotically stable if and only if Iδ2 < 1.
(2) The equilibrium x∗∗ is locally asymptotically stable if and only if Iδ1 < 1.
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(3) If Iδ1 or I
δ
2 is greater than 1, then the corresponding equilibrium is unstable.
Remark 1. We have shown that Iδ2 >
R2
R1
, and that Iδ1 <
R1
R2
. As a consequence the region of
the parameter space where the second ideology is locally asymptotically stable is larger (in
some sense) than that of the first ideology.
A consequence of this theorem is that in order for the first ideology to eliminate the second
(i.e. to out compete it), a necessary condition is that R1 > R2. In contrast, the second
ideology may be able eliminate the first one if R2 > R1, but also if R2 < R1. Thus, in
the case of “superinfection” (i.e. δ > 0) the principle that the ideology with the larger
reproduction number excludes the one with the smaller reproduction number is no longer
valid. Thus, an ideology (the second one) with suboptimal reproduction number may be
able to dominate the population. In the presence of “superinfection”, individuals supporting
ideology one may “convert” to ideology two, and this may give the competitive advantage
to ideology two even if its reproduction number is smaller.
4.4. A Discussion of Coexistence Equilibria. In Section 3 it was shown that for δ = 0,
the only possible equilibria are x0, x
∗ and x∗∗, and so there are no equilibria for which both
ideologies are present. For δ > 0 it is possible to have an equilibrium with both ideologies
present. We will refer to such an equilibrium as a coexistence equilibrium. (Thus far, we
have found no evidence of multiple coexistence equilibria.)
In this section, we will sometimes assume that R1, R2 or both are greater than one, so
that x∗, x∗∗ or both exist and hence the invasion numbers Iδ1 , I
δ
2 or both are defined (and
positive). As was discussed in the previous subsection, whether or not each of Iδ1 and I
δ
2
is greater than 1 affects the qualitative behaviour of the system, in part by determining
the local stabilities of x∗ and x∗∗. We will now show that these quantities also affect other
properties of the system.
We will consider δ as a bifurcation parameter. Let δ∗ and δ∗∗, respectively, be the values of
δ that make Iδ2 and I
δ
1 equal to 1 (if such a value exists). (Thus, δ
∗ arises from a calculation
involving x∗, while δ∗∗ arises from a calculation involving x∗∗.) Then
δ∗ =
1
E∗1
c˜2D2
qR2D2 (R1 −R2) + cE2 (cR2 + qE2 (µ+ dR2))
(R1 −R2)
and
δ∗∗ =
1
E∗∗2
c˜1D1
qR1D1 (R2 −R1) + cE1 (cR1 + qE1 (µ+ dR1))
(R1 −R2) .
Suppose R1 > 1. Then x
∗ exists and Iδ2 > 0. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition
for δ∗ to be positive is R2 < R1. If δ = δ
∗ > 0, then Iδ2 is equal to 1, and the Jacobian at x
∗
has 0 as an eigenvalue. If δ increases through δ∗, then the stability of x∗ changes. This is the
only value of δ that could lead to a coexistence equilibrium having a bifurcation interaction
with x∗ (also likely through a saddle node bifurcation).
Suppose R2 > 1. Then x
∗∗ exists and Iδ1 > 0. Note that a necessary condition for δ
∗∗ to
be positive is R2 < R1. If δ = δ
∗∗ > 0, then Iδ1 is equal to 1, and the Jacobian at x
∗∗ has 0
as an eigenvalue. If δ increases through δ∗∗, then the stability of x∗∗ changes from unstable
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(for smaller values of δ) to locally asymptotically stable (for larger values of δ). This is the
only value of δ that could lead to a coexistence equilibrium having a bifurcation interaction
with x∗∗ (likely through a saddle node bifurcation).
If δ∗ and δ∗∗ are both positive (and distinct), then as δ increases from very small values
to very large values it will first pass through the smaller of δ∗ and δ∗∗, and then through
the larger. This corresponds to a coexistence equilibrium entering the positive orthant by
passing through one of x∗ and x∗∗ and then leaving the positive orthant by passing through
the other.
If δ∗, δ∗∗ > 0, then let
σ = δ∗∗ − δ∗
(otherwise σ is left undefined). Depending on the system parameters, it is possible to have
σ positive or negative (or zero on a set of measure zero). The sign of σ determines whether
the coexistence equilibrium (which is absent for δ = 0) appears in R5≥0 (as δ is increased) by
passing through x∗ and leaves by passing through x∗∗, or the opposite. That is, the sign of
σ determines the large scale motion of the coexistence equilibrium. Numerical evidence (not
included here) shows that it is possible to have σ being either positive or negative.
We now consider different possible outcomes that may arise. In this discussion it is useful
to recall from Section 4.3 that
∂Iδ
1
∂δ
< 0 and
∂Iδ
2
∂δ
> 0.
Situation 1: Suppose 1 < R1 < R2. Under this assumption we have:
• x∗ and x∗∗ both exist.
• For δ = 0, we have:
– Iδ2 =
R2
R1
> 1 and so x∗ is unstable.
– Iδ1 =
R1
R2
< 1 and so x∗∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
– By Theorem 3.5, x∗∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
Since Iδ1 and I
δ
2 are monotone functions of δ, it follows that I
δ
1 < 1 < I
δ
2 for all δ > 0.
Thus, x∗ is unstable and x∗∗ is locally asymptotically stable for all δ > 0, and there is no
coexistence equilibrium. It is plausible that x∗∗ is globally asymptotically stable for all δ > 0.
(See Section 4.5.)
Situation 2: Suppose 1 < R2 < R1. Under this assumption we have:
• x∗ and x∗∗ both exist.
• For δ = 0, we have:
– Iδ1 =
R1
R2
> 1 and so x∗∗ is unstable.
– Iδ2 =
R2
R1
< 1 and so x∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
– By Theorem 3.5, x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
• δ∗ > 0.
• δ∗∗ could be positive or negative.
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In order to determine how the behaviour of the system changes as δ increases, it is necessary
to consider the size of δ relative to δ∗ and δ∗∗. Hence, we consider three cases based on how
δ∗∗ compares to 0 and δ∗.
Case 2A: Suppose δ∗∗ < 0. Then:
• Iδ1 > 1 for all δ > 0, and so x
∗∗ is unstable for all δ > 0, and the first ideology is
always able to invade near x∗∗.
• If 0 ≤ δ < δ∗, then x∗ is locally asymptotically stable and the second ideology is
unable to invade near x∗. There is no coexistence equilibrium.
• If δ∗ < δ, then x∗ is unstable and the second ideology can invade near x∗. With
both x∗ and x∗∗ being unstable, there is a locally asymptotically stable coexistence
equilibrium.
In this case, as δ increases from 0 to very large values, a stable coexistence equilibrium
appears by passing through x∗.
Case 2B: Suppose 0 < δ∗∗ < δ∗, so that σ < 0. Then:
• If 0 ≤ δ < δ∗∗, then x∗ is locally asymptotically stable and the second ideology is
unable to invade near x∗, whereas x∗∗ is unstable and so the first ideology can invade
near x∗∗. There is no coexistence equilibrium.
• If δ∗∗ < δ < δ∗, then x∗ and x∗∗ are both locally asymptotically stable and so neither
ideology can invade near the equilibrium where the other ideology is dominant. In
this setting, there is an unstable coexistence equilibrium.
• If δ∗ < δ, then x∗ is unstable and x∗∗ is locally asymptotically unstable. There is no
coexistence equilibrium.
In this case, as δ increases from 0 to very large values, an unstable coexistence equilibrium
appears by passing through x∗∗, traverses through the positive orthant and disappears by
passing through x∗.
Case 2C: Suppose δ∗ < δ∗∗, so that σ > 0. Then:
• If 0 ≤ δ < δ∗, then x∗ is locally asymptotically stable and the second ideology is
unable to invade near x∗, whereas x∗∗ is unstable and so the first ideology can invade
near x∗∗. There is no coexistence equilibrium.
• If δ∗ < δ < δ∗∗, then x∗ and x∗∗ are both unstable and so each ideology can invade
near the equilibrium where the other ideology is dominant. In this setting, there is a
stable coexistence equilibrium.
• If δ∗∗ < δ, then x∗ is unstable and x∗∗ is locally asymptotically unstable. There is no
coexistence equilibrium.
In this case, as δ increases from 0 to very large values, a stable coexistence equilibrium
appears by passing through x∗, traverses through the positive orthant and disappears by
passing through x∗∗.
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For small values of δ, Cases 2B and 2C yield similar phase spaces in terms of the stability
of x∗ and x∗∗, as well as in the lack of a coexistence equilibrium. This is also true for large
values of δ. The difference arises when δ lies between δ∗ and δ∗∗, in which case the sign of σ
determines the local stability of the coexistence equilibrium as well as it’s general direction
of motion - from x∗ to x∗∗ or the opposite.
Situation 3: Suppose R2 < 1 < R1. Under this assumption we have:
• x∗ exists - and so Iδ2 is defined and positive.
• x∗∗ does not exist - and so Iδ1 is not defined and neither is δ
∗∗.
• For δ = 0, we have:
– Iδ2 =
R2
R1
< 1 and so x∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
– By Theorem 3.5, x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
• δ∗ > 0.
As δ is varied, we have:
• If 0 ≤ δ < δ∗, then x∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
• If δ∗ < δ, then x∗ is unstable. Then the second ideology is able to invade near
x∗, even though it is unable to invade near x0. (It would appear that the second
ideology is more attractive to adherents of the first ideology than it is to individuals
in susceptible group.) A locally asymptotically stable coexistence equilibrium exists.
In this situation, as δ increases, a stable coexistence equilibrium appears, and then remains
no matter how large δ becomes.
Situation 4: Suppose R1 < 1 < R2. Under this assumption we have:
• x∗∗ exists - and so Iδ1 is defined and positive.
• x∗ does not exist - and so Iδ2 is not defined and neither is δ
∗.
• For δ = 0, we have:
– Iδ1 =
R1
R2
< 1 and so x∗∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
– By Theorem 3.5, x∗∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
• δ∗∗ < 0.
In this situation, there is no qualitative change regarding the equilibria and their local
behaviours as δ varies from 0 to ∞.
Remark 2. From numerical experiments, it appears that when the coexistence equilibrium
exists, it is unique.
4.5. Global stability.
Theorem 4.4. If R1,R2 ≤ 1, then x0 is globally asymptotically stable (for all δ ≥ 0).
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, the attractor for the system must be contained in the set ∆˜, and
so it is sufficient to consider a Lyapunov function on this set. In particular, we may assume
that the variables are non-negative and satisfy S +E1 +R1 +E2 +R2 ≤ S0, where S0 =
Λ
µ
.
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Let
U = E1 +
µ+ dE1 + cE1
cE1
R1 + E2 +
µ+ dE2 + cE2
cE2
R2.
Then a straight-forward calculation produces
U ′ = E ′1 +
µ+ dE1 + cE1
cE1
R′1 + E
′
2 +
µ+ dE2 + cE2
cE2
R′2
=
D1
cE1
(
c˜1
D1
β1S − 1
)
R1 +
D2
cE2
(
c˜2
D2
β2S − 1
)
R2
=
D1
cE1
(
R1
S
S0
− 1
)
R1 +
D2
cE2
(
R2
S
S0
− 1
)
R2.
On the set ∆˜, this is less than or equal to zero, with equality only if R1 = R2 = 0. The
largest invariant subset of ∆˜ that satisfies R1 = R2 = 0 is the singleton consisting of x0.
Thus, by LaSalles Invariance Principle, x0 is globally asymptotically stable. 
In order for one of x∗ and x∗∗ to be globally asymptotically stable, it is necessary for that
equilibrium to be locally asymptotically stable and for the other to be unstable. Thus, the
following result follows from Theorem 4.3 and from the comparisons between the invasion
numbers and the ratios of the reproduction numbers.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose δ > 0.
(1) In order for x∗ to be globally asymptotically stable, a necessary condition is that
R2
R1
< Iδ2 < 1 < I
δ
1 <
R1
R2
.
(2) In order for x∗∗ to be globally asymptotically stable, a necessary condition is that
Iδ1 < min
{
1, R1
R2
}
and max
{
1, R2
R1
}
< Iδ2 .
Regarding the minimum and maximum that appear in the second statement of this propo-
sition, either both are equal to 1 or neither is equal to 1.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose R2 > max {1,R1} and
cE2
c˜2
<
cE1
c˜1
. Then x∗∗ is globally asymptoti-
cally stable.
Proof. We begin by interpreting the Lyapunov calculation from the proof of Theorem 3.5 as
a calculation for system (4.1) for the special case δ = 0. We use the same Lyapunov function
W = S∗∗g
(
S
S∗∗
)
+
cE1
c˜1
E1 +
µ+ dE1 + cE1
c˜1
R1 + AE
∗∗
2 g
(
E2
E∗∗2
)
+BR∗∗2 g
(
R2
R∗∗2
)
,
where A and B are again chosen so that
AqE2 +BqR2 = 1 and BcE2E
∗∗
2 = AcR2R
∗∗
2 + AqE2β2S
∗∗R∗∗2 .
Note that at x∗∗, the equation for E ′2 = 0 implies cR2R
∗∗
2 +qE2β2S
∗∗R∗∗2 = (µ+ dE2 + cE2)E
∗∗
2 ,
and so it follows that A =
cE2
c˜2
and B =
µ+dE2+cE2
c˜2
.
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Let (s, e2, r2) =
(
S
S∗∗
, E2
E∗∗
2
, R2
R∗∗
2
)
. Then (3.2) gives an expression for W ′ for the case where
δ = 0. By replicating the calculation that produced (3.2), for a general δ ≥ 0, we obtain
W ′ = µS∗∗
[
2− s−
1
s
]
+ AcR2R
∗∗
2
[
2−
e2
r2
−
r2
e2
]
+ β2S
∗∗R∗∗2
[
AqE2
(
3−
1
s
−
e2
r2
−
sr2
e2
)
+BqR2
(
2− s−
1
s
)]
+
D1
c˜1
(
R1
R2
− 1
)
R1
+ δE1E2
[
−
cE1
c˜1
+ A
(
1−
E∗∗2
E2
)]
We now focus on the final term, which we call δ˜:
δ˜ = δE1E2
[
−
cE1
c˜1
+ A
(
1−
E∗∗2
E2
)]
= δE1
[(
A−
cE1
c˜1
)
E2 −AE
∗∗
2
]
.
Recalling that A =
cE2
c˜2
, it follows that the condition
cE2
c˜2
<
cE1
c˜1
implies δ˜ is less than or equal
to zero. Then, by combining the assumption that R2 > max {1,R1} with the Arithmetic
Mean-Geometric Mean Inequality, it follows that W ′ ≤ 0 on R5>0 with equality only if s = 1
and R1 = 0. Using LaSalle’s Invariance Principle, in a similar manner to how it was used
in the proofs of Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 3.5, it follows that x∗∗ is globally asymptotically
stable in R5>0. 
Remark 3. In the preceding proof, it is sufficient to restrict our analysis to the set ∆˜, in which
E2 ≤
Λ
µ
. Thus, in ∆˜, δ˜ ≤ 0 (and therefore W ′ ≤ 0) as long as A ≤
Λ
µ
Λ
µ
−E∗∗
2
cE1
c˜1
= 1
1−
µ
Λ
E∗∗
2
cE1
c˜1
(which is larger than
cE1
c˜1
). This allows Theorem 4.6 to be restated with less restrictive (but
messier) conditions.
Remark 4. The portion of the parameter space for which Theorem 4.6 applies is a subset
of the parameters that result in Situations 1 and 4 in Section 4.4. In Case 1B, we saw that
if 1 < R1 < R2 and 0 < δ
∗ < δ, then x∗∗ is not globally asymptotically stable, and so
Theorem 4.6 must not apply. In that case, the conversion from ideology one to ideology two
(i.e. having δ > 0) has fundamentally changed the global dynamics from how they were with
δ = 0.
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